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We explore the properties of a credit network characterized by inside credit - i.e. credit relationships
connecting downstream (D) and upstream (U) firms - and outside credit - i.e. credit relationships connecting
firms and banks. The structure of the network changes over time due to the preferred-partner choice
rule: each agent chooses the partner who charges the lowest price. The net worth of D firms turns out
to be the driver of fluctuations. U production, in fact, is determined by demand of intermediate inputs
on the part of D firms and production of the latter is financially constrained, i.e. determined by the
availability of internal finance proxied by net worth. The output of simulations shows that at the macroeconomic
level a business cycle can develop as a consequence of the complex interaction of the agents' financial
conditions. We can also reproduce the main stylized facts of firms' demography, i.e. the power law
distribution of firms' size and the Laplace distribution of firms' growth rates.
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Networks are the main subject of a rapidly growing literature which applies
the conceptual and analytical tools already developed in sociology, computer
science and physics to economics and/or provides new notions and methods
to be applied speci¯cally to economic phenomena. Recent books by Jack-
son (2008), Vega-Redondo (2007) and Goyal (2007) describe the frontier of
research on economic networks.1
The complex pattern of credit relationships is a natural research issue to
be dealt with by means of network analysis. It is straightforward to think of
agents as nodes and of debt contracts as links in a credit network. There are
indeed in°uential examples of network analysis applied to credit networks.
Allen and Gale (2000), for instance, put forward a theory of \¯nancial
contagion" in a network model of the interbank market. In this case, however,
the networks considered are very simple and easy to study because they
consist of few nodes organized in canonical forms. A non-negligible and
growing literature has developed from these premises on the network of the
interbank market (Freixas, Parigi and Rochet, 2000; Fur¯ne, 2003; Boss,
Elsinger, Summer and Thurner, 2004; Iori et al., 2006; Nier et al., 2007).
A di®erent but no less important line of network research (Boissay, 2006;
Battiston et al., 2007) focuses on the trade-credit relationships within the
corporate sector, i.e. among suppliers of intermediate goods and producers
of ¯nal goods along the \supply chain".
These strands of network literature analyze speci¯c credit relationships:
among banks on the interbank market or among ¯rms along the supply chain.
Building upon ideas expounded ¯rst in Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003, chapter
7), in Delli Gatti et al. (2006) we have pursued a more general and \encom-
passing" line of research. We have modelled a credit network consisting of
households, ¯rms and banks. Agents are linked by inside credit (i.e. credit
relationships connecting ¯rms belonging to di®erent layers of the same indus-
try { the corporate sector { or connecting banks on the interbank market)
and outside credit (i.e. credit relationships connecting agents belonging to
di®erent sectors, i.e. banks and ¯rms).
In that paper, the network is static, i.e. its structure does not change
1See also the extensive surveys on network formation by Jackson and on learning in
networks by Goyal in the the book edited by Demange and Wooders (2005). Caldarelli
(2007) analyzes networks from the physicist's point of view. His book presents plenty of
applications to di®erent ¯elds, economics being only one of them.
2over time. The speci¯c contribution of the present paper is the introduction
of a mechanism for the endogenous evolution of the network structure, the
preferred-partner choice rule.
Jackson (2005) distinguishes between a random graph approach to net-
work formation, borrowed from physics, and the game theoretic approach
speci¯cally designed to deal with economic networks. The former is, in a
sense, \mechanical": network formation is purely stochastic or the product
of an ad hoc algorithm. The latter focuses on \equilibrium" networks, where
links are formed as a consequence of cost-bene¯t analysis on the part of
self-interested agents.
The approach followed in the present paper is half-way between the two:
the preferred partner choice rule allocates links to nodes as a consequence
of the search for the lowest price. In every period, an agent in search of a
partner in a transaction { a customer in search of a supplier, a ¯rm in search
of a bank { chooses the partner who posts the minimum price in a randomly
selected subset of agents; if the minimum price is lower than the price the
agent paid to the old partner in the previous period, he will switch to the
new partner, otherwise he will stick to the old one. The number of links
connecting the nodes changes over time so that the topology of the network
is also in a process of continuous evolution.
Central to this picture is information, not only about the conditions of the
parties in a credit relationship but also about the incentives that they face.
Lenders have to assess the risk involved in extending credit to borrowers,
i.e. their ability and willingness to ful¯ll debt obligations. But informa-
tion is asymmetric so that such an assessment is at best incomplete: all the
issues crucial to modelling borrowers' and lenders' behaviour in an asymmet-
ric information context are relevant also in designing the network of credit
relationships. In this context, a simple and easily available indirect sign
of the borrowers' creditworthiness is a measure of their ¯nancial soundness
captured, for instance, by net worth.
In the credit network we consider, households are ¯nal consumers labour-
suppliers. The corporate sector consists of two layers of ¯rms. Downstream
(D) ¯rms produce consumption goods, while upstream (U) ¯rms supply in-
termediate inputs to D ¯rms. Banks extend credit to ¯rms in both layers. D
¯rms are pure borrowers: they borrow from U ¯rms (trade credit) and from
banks (bank loans). Banks are pure lenders: they lend to D and U ¯rms. U
¯rms are borrowers and lenders at the same time: they borrow from banks
and lend to D ¯rms.
3Adopting a ¯nancing hierarchy perspective, we assume that the scale of
production of D ¯rms is constrained only by their net worth. Since U output
is determined by the input requirements of D ¯rms, the net worth of D ¯rms
turns out to be the main driver of °uctuations. Changes in the net worth of
D ¯rms, in fact, brings about changes in the same direction of U production.
An unexpected shock to a D ¯rm a®ects the credit relationship between the
¯rm and its supplier, on the one hand, and between the ¯rm and the bank
on the other.
If the shock is large enough, the D ¯rm may be unable to ful¯ll debt
commitments and may go bankrupt. The bankruptcy of a borrower would
be irrelevant if, so to speak, the agent were an \island". In a networked econ-
omy, however, bankruptcy will not be an isolated and therefore insigni¯cant
phenomenon.
Interdependence may assume di®erent forms. For instance, the bankruptcy
of a D ¯rm may bring about the default of the U ¯rm with which it interacts
along the supply chain. Moreover \bad debt" { i.e. non-performing loans {
a®ect the net worth of banks, which can also go bankrupt. If they manage to
survive, they will react to the deterioration of borrowers' ¯nancial conditions
increasing the interest rate. The interest rate hike leads to more bankrupt-
cies and eventually to a bankruptcy chain: \the high rate of bankruptcy is
a cause of the high interest rate as much as a consequence of it" (Stiglitz,
Greenwald, 2003: 145).
Therefore, the default of one agent can bring about an avalanche of
bankruptcies which may be due to direct interaction between the bankrupt
¯rm and its supplier or to indirect interaction through the banking system.
In the latter case, in fact, while the proximate cause of the bankruptcy of
a certain ¯rm in the middle of the avalanche is the interest rate hike, the
remote cause is the bankruptcy of a ¯rm at the beginning of the avalanche
that forced the banks to push interest rates up.2
The endogenous evolution of credit interlinkages through the preferred
partner choice rule a®ects the extent of bankruptcies' di®usion: the bankruptcy
of an highly connected agent increases the probability of bankruptcy di®usion
across the network.
2Delli Gatti et al. (2005) emphasize the role of indirect interaction in the development
of an avalanche of bankruptcies. In the agent-based economy considered in that paper, in
fact there is no customer-supplier network so that bankruptcies due to direct interaction
cannot be observed by construction.
4All in all, we consider four markets: consumption goods, intermediate
inputs, labour and credit. \Quantities", i.e. the amount of consumption
and intermediate goods produced, labour employed and credit extended are
not directly a®ected by \prices". They depend, instead, as we have already
pointed out above, on the ¯nancial conditions of the agents involved.
Prices, however, play an essential role in (i) shaping the evolving topology
of the network and (ii) determining the degree of agents' ¯nancial vulnera-
bility.
As to (i), in two of the markets considered, i.e. the markets for inter-
mediate inputs and for bank loans, the preferred partner choice rule implies
that the price charged by a supplier to a customer { which incorporates the
interest rate on commercial paper { and the interest rate on bank loans a®ect
the number of clients of each U ¯rm and the number of loan applications to
each bank respectively and therefore impacts upon the evolution of network
connectivity.
As to (ii), prices are important determinants of pro¯ts, which in turn
a®ect the accumulation of net worth and ¯nancial fragility. The ¯nancial
vulnerability of an agent therefore is a®ected by the dynamics of prices.
On the markets for consumption goods and on the labour market, \prices"
are exogenously determined and play a less relevant role. Following Greenwald-
Stiglitz (1993), we assume that on the market for consumption goods, prices
are governed by a random process (we elaborate a little bit on this issue
below). As to the labour market, we appeal to real rigidity of one sort or an-
other so that we feel entitled to take the real wage as given and constant. In
these cases, for the sake of simplicity and clarity we have admittedly adopted
a very crude \theory" of prices. We will relax these assumption and enrich
the theory in further extensions of the present model. Our conjecture, how-
ever, is that qualitatively the main results of the model { in particular the
output of simulations { will not be remarkably a®ected by this relaxation.
We study the properties of the network by means of simulations, which
show that a business cycle at the macroeconomic level can develop as a
consequence of the complex interaction of the agents' ¯nancial conditions. In
other words, statistical regularities emerge as a self-organised process at the
aggregate level. At the same time, the main facts of ¯rms' demography (such
as power law distribution of ¯rms' size and Laplace distribution of growth
rates) emerge endogenously. In the case of the preferred choice rule the ¯rms'
size distribution and the degree distribution are much more asymmetric than
in the case of random matching.
5The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we sketch the main assump-
tion concerning the economy under scrutiny. Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to
the price/quantity decisions of agents, i.e. ¯rms and banks respectively. In
section 5 we explain the mechanism governing the choice of the partner. In
section 6 we analyze the main determinants of pro¯ts. Section 7 is devoted
to the relationship between pro¯ts, net worth and bad debt. In section 8 we
discuss the results of the simulations. Section 9 concludes.
2 The environment
We model a multi-sector economy in discrete time (t = 1;2;:::;T) pop-
ulated by a multitude of heterogeneous agents. The economy consists of
three sectors: a downstream sector consisting of I ¯rms (labeled by the in-
dex i = 1;2;:::;I), an upstream sector with J ¯rms (j = 1;2;:::;J) and a
banking sector consisting of Z banks (z = 1;2;:::;Z): In order to keep the
analysis simple, the number of ¯rms and of banks is exogenous.3
There are two goods, a consumption good and an intermediate good. D
¯rms produce a perishable consumption good using labor and intermediate
goods. For simplicity and as a ¯rst approximation to a more realistic setting,
we assume that ¯rms sell all the output they produce at a stochastic price.
U ¯rms produce the intermediate good \on demand" with a technology
that requires only labor. Therefore U ¯rms do not hold inventories of interme-
diate goods. We are ruling out by construction the possibility of avalanches
of output due to the mismatch of demand and supply of intermediate goods
along a supply chain µ a la Bak, Chen, Scheinkman and Woodford (1993).
The ¯nancial side of the economy is characterized by two lending rela-
tionships: (i) downstream and upstream ¯rms obtain credit from banks; (ii)
downstream ¯rms buy intermediate goods from upstream ¯rms by means of
a commercial credit contract.
The structure of the network of expenditure, production and credit re-
lationships evolves endogenously due to the decentralized interaction among
agents, on the basis of a simple incentive mechanism which we have labelled
the preferred-partner choice: in every period each D ¯rm looks for the U
3Since in our framework agents can leave the market due to bankruptcy, in order to
preserve constancy of the number of agents we have to apply a one-to-one replacement
procedure when an agent goes bankrupt.
6¯rm with the lowest price of intermediate goods; at the same time each ¯rm
searches for the bank with the lowest interest rate.
3 Firms
The core assumption of the model is that the scale of activity of the i ¡ th
D ¯rm at time t { i.e. the level of production Yit { is an increasing concave




where Á > 1, 0 < ¯ < 1 are parameters, uniform across D ¯rms. The
equation above represents the ¯nancially constrained output function.
There are (at least) two rationales for (1). First, it can be thought of as
a simple rule of thumb in a world in which (i) bounded rationality prevents
the elaboration of optimizing decision-making processes and (ii) asymmetric
information between borrowers and lenders yields a ¯nancing hierarchy in
which net worth ranks ¯rst.
Alternatively one can think of equation (1) as the solution of an op-
timization problem on the part of the ¯rm. According to Greenwald and
Stiglitz (1993) for instance the problem of the ¯rm consists in maximizing ex-
pected pro¯ts E (¼i) net of bankruptcy costs Ci weighted by the probability of
bankruptcy ­i: From the de¯nition of pro¯ts follows that they are an increas-
ing function of output Yi given net worth Ai : ¼i = ¼ (Yi;Ai): Bankruptcy
costs are assumed to be increasing with the ¯rm's size: Ci = C (Yi). Finally,
from the de¯nition of the probability of bankruptcy, it turns out that it is
increasing with the scale of activity, given net worth: ­i = ­(Yi;Ai). An
increase of ¯nancial fragility, in fact, captured by a reduction of net worth,
brings about an increase of the probability of bankruptcy. In the end the
Greenwald-Stiglitz characterization of the problem of the ¯rm is:
max
Yi
V (Yi;Ai) = E (¼ (Yi;Ai)) ¡ C (Yi)­(Yi;Ai)
whose solution is
Yi = argmaxV (Yi;Ai) = f (Ai) (2)
with f0 > 0: Equation (1) can be considered an element in the set of functional
forms consistent with (2).
7By construction, the second interpretation of (1) is grounded on more
stringent requirements of rationality than those implicit in (i) above. How-
ever, it is still true that asymmetric information yields a ¯nancing hierarchy
as assumed in (ii).
The concavity of the ¯nancially constrained output function (1) captures
the idea that there are "decreasing returns" to ¯nancial robustness: the
increase in output associated to a given increase of net worth is lower if
the ¯rm is already ¯nancially robust. If the ¯nancially constrained output
function is the same for all D ¯rms, by Jensen's inequality an increase in
the variance of ¯nancial conditions brings about a reduction of average (and
therefore aggregate) output of D ¯rms.
For simplicity we assume that the production function of each D ¯rm
is of the Leontief type: Yi = min( 1
±dNi; 1
°Qi) where Ni is employment and
Qi are intermediate inputs, ±d > 0 and ° > 0: Therefore, each D ¯rm has
the following labor and intermediate goods requirement functions: Nit =
±dYit; Qit = °Yit: Taking into account (1), in the end, both the demand for
labor and the demand for intermediate goods of D ¯rms are increasing and
concave functions of their ¯nancial conditions: Nit = ±dÁA
¯
it; Qit = °ÁA
¯
it:
Final goods are sold at a stochastic price uit. For the sake of simplic-
ity, we assume that uit is a random variable uniformly distributed on the
support (0,2). We can provide the following rationale for this apparently
restrictive assumption. Let the demand of the i ¡ th commodity in period t
be d(uit;±it+1) where uit is the relative price of the i¡th commodity and ±it
is a stochastic demand disturbance speci¯c to the market in question. Let
supply be sit. By assumption sit is made up of the quantities produced by
a \large number" of producers so that the contribution of each ¯rm to total
supply is negligible. In equilibrium uit = f (±it;sit) i.e. the relative price is
an increasing function of the demand disturbance, given the predetermined
supply. If demand is su±ciently elastic, changes in supply do not a®ect the
relative price signi¯cantly so that the relative price is essentially an increasing
function of random demand. A high realization of uit can be thought of as a
regime of high demand which drives up the relative price of the commodity
in question. In a regime of low demand, the realization of uit turns out to
be low and may push the ¯rm out of the market if it is \too low", i.e. if it
makes the net worth of the ¯rm negative.
Upstream ¯rms produce the intermediate good by means of a linear tech-
nology which employs only labor: Qjt = 1
±uNjt where ±u > 0. For simplicity,
we assume an asymmetric structure of the D-U network: many D ¯rms can
8be linked to a single U ¯rm but each D ¯rm has only one supplier of inter-
mediate goods.
In each period the supplier { say the j ¡ th ¯rm { receives orders from a
set of D customers which will be denoted by ©j: Since each D ¯rm looks for
the U ¯rm with the lowest price of intermediate goods, by construction the
number of elements of ©j depends on the price pjt that the upstream ¯rm
charges to its customers: the lower the price, the higher the number of D
customers of the j ¡ th supplier of intermediate goods.
The price the supplier is charging is de¯ned as pjt = 1 + rjt where rjt is
the interest rate on trade credit. We assume that the level of rjt depends on




with ® > 0: In words, the interest rate on commercial paper charged
to each and every D ¯rm belonging to ©j is decreasing with the ¯nancial
soundness of the U ¯rm. If the U ¯rm is in good shape from the ¯nancial
point of view, it will be eager to extend trade credit at more favourable terms
to its D customers.
In principle, the interest rate on trade credit charged by the j ¡ th U
¯rm should be a®ected also by the ¯nancial conditions of the borrowers, i.e.
of the D ¯rms in the set ©j. In order to keep the framework as simple as
possible, however, we have assumed that asymmetric information prevents
a correct assessment of the ¯nancial conditions of the borrowers. Therefore
the interest rate on trade credit incorporates only the ¯nancial condition of
the lender.
While the scale of production of D ¯rms is ¯nancially constrained { i.e. it
is determined by their degree of ¯nancial robustness { the scale of production
of U ¯rms is demand constrained, i.e. it is determined by the demand of
intermediate goods on the part of D ¯rms. Therefore, the ¯nancial conditions
of D ¯rms are the driving force also for the production of U ¯rms. The more
robust, on average, D ¯rms, the higher their scale of activity and the demand
for labour and intermediate goods so that the higher will be, on average, the
scale of activity of U ¯rms. For instance, the demand of intermediate goods
















Firms face a ¯nancing hierarchy in which internal ¯nance ranks ¯rst and
bank loans second. Therefore, by assumption, the ¯nancing gap, i.e. the
di®erence between the ¯rm's expenditures and internal ¯nance, is ¯lled by
means of credit. For U ¯rms, the ¯nancing gap is the di®erence between
the wage bill and net worth. As to D ¯rms, expenditures consist of wages
and the cost of intermediate goods. In order to keep the analysis as simple
as possible, however, we assume that also for D ¯rms the ¯nancing gap is
the di®erence between the wage bill and net worth. This means that the
acquisition of intermediate goods can be ¯nanced by means of trade credit,
not by bank loans.
Accordingly, the demand of credit is equal to Bxt = Wxt ¡ Axt where
Wxt = wNxt is the ¯rm's wage bill (x = i for D ¯rms, j for U ¯rms).
We assume that the real wage w is constant and uniform across ¯rms. By
assumption, moreover, labour is abundant so that ¯rms do not face any
labour shortage at the pre-determined real wage.
Self-¯nanced ¯rms, i.e. ¯rms with a level of net worth su±cient to ¯nance
the wage bill, do not demand credit. From the expression above follows that
the demand for credit of the i ¡ th D ¯rm is
Bit = wNit ¡ Ait = w±dÁA
¯
it ¡ Ait (4)
so that a D ¯rm is self ¯nanced if it has net worth Ait ¸ ^ A ´ (w±dÁ)
1
1¡¯ :
As to U ¯rms, the demand for credit of the j ¡ th U ¯rm is





it ¡ Ajt (5)






The higher the net worth of D customers of the U ¯rm, the less likely it is
that the U ¯rm will be self ¯nanced.
For simplicity, we assume an asymmetric structure of the ¯rms-banks
network: many ¯rms can be linked to a single bank but each ¯rm has only
one supplier of loans. The set of customers of the z¡th bank will be denoted
by ©z: We assume that each bank has a certain degree of market power. Since
each ¯rm looks for the bank with the lowest interest rate, by construction
the number of elements of ©z depends on the interest rate the bank charges
10to its customers: the lower the interest rate, the higher the number of ¯rms
applying for loans to the z ¡ th bank.
The z ¡ th bank adopts the following rule in setting the interest rate on







where Azt is the net worth of the z ¡ th bank and lxt = Bxt=Axt is the
leverage ratio of the x ¡ th ¯rm, ¾ and µ positive parameters. Accordingly,
the interest rate on bank loans is (i) decreasing with the ¯nancial soundness
of the bank (proxied by the bank's net worth Azt) and (ii) increasing with
the ¯rms' leverage ratio.
The rationale of (i) is obvious: if the bank is in good shape from the
¯nancial point of view, it will be eager to extend credit at more favourable
terms. As to (ii), we simply assume that the ¯rm penalizes ¯nancially fragile
¯rms. In a sense, we adopt the principle according to which the interest rate
charged by the lender incorporates an external ¯nance premium increasing
with leverage and therefore inversely related to the borrower's net worth.4
Notice that the leverage ratio of the i ¡ th D ¯rm is
lit = Bit=Ait = w±d
Yit
Ait
¡ 1 = w±dÁA
¡(1¡¯)
it ¡ 1 (7)
i.e it is decreasing with net worth. Therefore, in the end, the interest rate












i.e. it will be a decreasing function of the net worth of the bank and of the
¯rm.
The situation is di®erent in the case of U ¯rms. The leverage of the j¡th
U ¯rm is










it ¡ 1 (9)
4In a sense in our model the bank behaves as a lender in a Bernanke-Gertler (1989,
1990) world characterized by asimmetryc information and costly state veri¯cation. See
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) for a comprehensive exposition of the approach.





it as shown above. The leverage of Uj ¯rm therefore is
decreasing with its own net worth but increasing with the net worth of the
downstream customers.


















i.e. it will be a decreasing function of the net worth of the bank and of the
j ¡ th ¯rm but an increasing function of the net worth of the D customers.
This may be counterintuitive but it is obvious in our context: the higher the
net worth of D customers, the higher their demand for intermediate goods,
the higher the debt { and therefore the leverage ratio, other things being
equal { that U suppliers have to accept in order to ¯nance the wage bill
and production and the higher the interest rate charged by the bank to the
U-¯rm.
5 Partners
Each agent has to choose not only the quantity and the price of the good to
be exchanged but also the partner to exchange with: a D ¯rm has to choose
a U partner and a bank; a U ¯rm has to choose a bank.
Each D ¯rm has a (productive and credit) relationship with a U ¯rm.
Initially, i.e. at time t = 1; the network of ¯rms is random, i.e. the links
among D and U ¯rms are established at random. Therefore, for instance the
D ¯rm indexed by i (Di) ends up linked to the U ¯rm indexed by j0 (Uj0). In
each of the subsequent periods, the network changes endogenously according
to a preferred-partner choice rule (with noise) which is de¯ned as follows:
² with (a small) probability " the D ¯rm chooses a partner (i.e. a U
supplier) at random;
² with probability 1¡" the D ¯rm chooses a partner looking at the prices
of a randomly selected number { say M { of U ¯rms;
{ if the miminum observed price { say the price of Uj1 { is lower
than the price of Uj0; then Di will switch to Uj1;
12{ otherwise, Di will stick to Uj0.
Therefore, the number of links connecting D nodes to a certain U node
changes over time due to the changing price charged by the U ¯rm so that
the topology of the network is also in a process of continuous evolution. The
total number of nodes, however, is constant.
The preferred-partner choice rule applies also to the relationship between
(both D and U) ¯rms and banks. At time t = 1 the links among ¯rms and
banks are established at random. For instance, ¯rm Di ends up linked to
bank z0 (Bz0). Afterwards, with probability 1 ¡ " each ¯rm looks at the
interest rate charged by a randomly selected number { say N { of banks. If
the miminum observed interest rate { say the one charged by Bz1 { is lower
than the one charged by Bz0;then Di will switch to Bz1; otherwise, it will
stick to Bz0.
The procedure to choose the partner is activated in every period { i.e.
with the same frequency of price/quantity decisions { but the partner is
changed less frequently, i.e. only when one of the prices the agent observes
is lower than the one charged by the existing partner. By construction,
therefore, the relationships between ¯rms of di®erent industries and between
¯rms and banks last longer than the transaction period.
6 Pro¯ts
The pro¯t of the i ¡ th D ¯rm is ¼it = uitYit ¡ (1 + ri
zt)Bit ¡ (1 + rjt)Qit
where uit is the stochastic price, Yit is output, ri
zt is the interest rate charged
by Bz to Di , rjt is the interest rate charged by Uj and Qit is the amount of
intermediate input that Di has bought from Uj.
Recalling that Qit = °Yit, output is ¯nancially constrained as shown in
(1) and Bit is de¯ned as in (4) we can rewrite the equation above as:
¼it =
£










zt and rjt are de¯ned as in (8) and (3) respectively, in the end Di's
pro¯t is a function of its own net worth and of the net worth of the U ¯rm
and of the bank.
Other things being equal, an increase of Ait a®ects Di's pro¯t for three
reasons:
13² it makes output increase (scale e®ect);
² it makes leverage decrease so that the interest rate charged by the bank
decreases too (D leverage e®ect);
² it makes the ¯nancing gap decrease. This e®ect is captured by the last
term in the LHS of (11) (¯nancing gap e®ect).
The scale e®ect can be either positive (if the expression in brackets is
positive, i.e. if the relative price is \su±ciently high" or the interest rates
are \su±ciently low") or negative (if the opposite holds true). The D leverage
and the ¯nancing gap e®ects are unambiguously positive.
Di's pro¯t is also a®ected by the ¯nancial conditions of the U supplier
and of the bank through the following externalities:
² an increase of Ajt makes Di's pro¯t increase because it makes the in-
terest rate charged by the supplier go down (U net worth e®ect);
² an increase of Azt makes Di's pro¯t increase because it makes the in-
terest rate charged by the bank go down (B net worth e®ect).
The pro¯t of the j ¡th upstream ¯rm is ¼jt = (1+rjt)Qjt ¡(1+r
j
zt)Bjt:























zt is de¯ned as in (10), Uj's pro¯t is a function of the net worth of
the agents involved, i.e. the U ¯rm itself, the set ©j of its D customers and
the bank.
An increase of Ajt a®ects Uj's pro¯t for three reasons:
² it makes Uj's leverage decrease, so that the interest rate charged by the
bank decreases too (U leverage e®ect);
² it makes the ¯nancing gap decrease. This e®ect is captured by the last
term in the LHS of (12) (¯nancing gap e®ect);
² it makes the price charged to D customers decrease (U net worth e®ect).
14The U leverage and the ¯nancing gap e®ects are positive while the U net
worth e®ect is negative.
Uj's pro¯t is also a®ected by the ¯nancial conditions of D customers and
of the bank through the following externalities:
² an increase of Azt makes Uj's pro¯t increase because it makes the in-
terest rate charged by the bank go down (B net worth e®ect);





it a®ects U output
(scale e®ect).
The bank's B net worth e®ect is positive while the scale e®ect can be
either positive (if the expression in brackets is positive, i.e. if the interest
rate on trade credit is \su±ciently high"and/or the interest rate on bank
loans is \su±ciently low") or negative (if the opposite holds true).










where Iz and Jz are, respectively, the set of D and U ¯rms interacting




























An increase of Azt a®ects Bz's pro¯t for the simple reason that it makes
the interest rate charged by the bank to both D and U ¯rms go down (B net
worth e®ect).
Bz's pro¯t is also a®ected by the ¯nancial conditions of D and U borrowers
through the following externalities:
² an increase of the net worth of D and U borrowers a®ects Bz's pro¯t be-
cause it makes their leverage decrease so that the interest rate charged
by the bank to these borrowers, i.e. ri
zt and r
j
zt go down (D leverage
and U leverage e®ects);
² an increase of the net worth of U borrowers a®ects Bz's pro¯t because
it makes the volume of loans to U customers decrease (U scale e®ect);
5Of course Iz [ Jz = ©z:
15² an increase of Di's net worth makes the volume of loans to U customers
increase while the volume of loans to D customers increases only if
(w±dÁ¯)
1
1¡¯ > Ait i.e. if the ¯rm is not self ¯nanced (D scale e®ect).
Table 1 summarizes the e®ects of net worth of each type of agent on the
pro¯t of the same agent (on the main diagonal) and on the pro¯ts of the
other agents (externalities, represented by o® diagonal entries).









Aj U net worth e. (+)





Az Bank's net w.e. (+) Bank's net w.e. (+) Bank's net w.e.(¡)
As will become clear in the following section, pro¯ts are an important
determinant of the °ow of new net worth: the higher pro¯ts today, the
higher will be net worth tomorrow. Table 1 therefore provides a rich and
complicated picture of interactions among the ¯nancial conditions of the
agents involved (Di;Uj;Bz).
For instance, the ¯rst column represents the impact of an increase of
net worth of Di;Uj;Bz on Di 's pro¯ts: There are obvious self-reinforcing
mechanisms at work. If the net worth of Di is growing, it is likely to grow
bigger in the future due to the D leverage and D ¯nancing gap e®ects. Di
can also bene¯t, in terms of pro¯ts and net worth accumulation, from an
increase of Uj 's and Bz 's net worth, due to the U and B net worth e®ects.
There are, however, also self-stabilizing mechanisms, which work mainly
through the banking system. An increase of Uj's and Di's net worth, for
instance, tends to depress the accumulation of the bank's net worth due to
the leverage e®ect and the U scale e®ect. The co-existence of self-reinforcing
and self-stabilizing mechanisms is the source of the oscillating behaviour of
aggregate time series generated by the simulations that we will review in
section 8.
167 Bad debt and net worth
In our framework, the U ¯rms and the banks are lenders while both types of
¯rms can be borrowers (if they are not self-¯nanced).
D ¯rms therefore are pure borrowers. At the end of the period, the net
worth of the i ¡ th D ¯rm is de¯ned as follows
Ait+1 = Ait + ¼it (14)
i.e. pro¯ts are the °ow of new net worth. The D ¯rm goes bankrupt if
Ait+1 · 0 i.e. if it incurs a loss (negative pro¯t) and the loss is big enough
to deplete net worth:
¼it · ¡Ait
The net worth of D ¯rms is the \engine" of °uctuations for the entire
economy. In fact, by means of (1) Di 's net worth determines Di's output,
which in turn generates the demand for intermediate goods produced by U
¯rms. As a consequence also the demand for labour of the D and U ¯rms
are determined by the net worth of D ¯rms.
Substituting (11) into (14) we get:
Ait+1 = Ait +
£






it + (1 + r
i
zt)Ait (15)
The net worth of the D ¯rm in t+1 Ait+1 depends in a non linear way on Ait
but also on the net worth of the U supplier { which determines rjt as de¯ned
in (3) { and on the net worth of the bank, which enters into (8).
The net worth of the x ¡ th lender (x = j for U ¯rms, z for banks) is
de¯ned as follows
Axt+1 = Axt + ¼xt ¡ BDxt
where BDxt is \bad debt". In fact, if a borrower cannot pay back the loan
obtained from the lender and goes bankrupt, the lender has a bad debt (non-
performing loan), that is accounted for as a reduction of its net worth. The
lender goes bankrupt if Axt+1 · 0 i.e. if
¼xt + Axt · BDxt
In principle therefore, the lender can go bankrupt even pro¯ts are still
positive if non-performing loans are high enough to wipe out net worth.
17Substituting (12) into the de¯nition, Uj's net worth turns out to be
Ajt+1 = Ajt+
£

















amount of trade credit not reimbursed (intermediate goods not paid for) by
bankrupt D customers, which are grouped for convenience in the set ©B
j .
The net worth in t+1 Ajt+1 depends in a non linear way on Ajt but also on
the net worth of the D customers, which determines output of the U ¯rm
and bad debt (the set of bankrupt ¯rms is a subset of D customers of the U
supplier) { and on the net worth of the bank, which enters into (10).








































i.e. non-performing loans of bankrupt D and U ¯rms, which are grouped for
convenience in the set ©B
z . The net worth of the D and U borrowers co-
determines the evolution over time of Azt+1.
Finally, we assume a simple mechanism of entry-exit: bankrupt ¯rms/banks
are replaced with new entrants on the basis of a one-to-one replacement.6
8 Simulations
We explore the dynamic properties of the network economy modelled above
by means of computer simulation. We consider an economy consisting of
I = 500 D ¯rms, J = 250 U ¯rms and Z = 100 banks over a time span of
6Accordingly, the total number of agents in the economy is constant over time. New
agents are endowed with an initial amount of net worth drawn from a uniform distribution
with mean 1 and ¯nite variance. We assume the entrant is small relative to the size of the
incumbent ¯rms.
18T = 1000 periods. There are 12 parameters in the model, which are set as
follows:
Table 2. Parameter setting
¯nancially constrained output of D ¯rms Á = 1:5 ¯ = 0:8
labour requirement of D and U ¯rms ±d = 0:5 ±u = 1
intermediate goods requirement of D ¯rms ° = 0:5
interest rate on trade credit ® = 0:1
interest rate on bank loans ¾ = 0:1 µ = 0:05
real wage w = 1
number of potential partners M = 5 N = 5
probability of preferred-partner choice 1 ¡ " = 0:99
The net worth of each D and U ¯rm and of each bank at the beginning
of the time horizon is set to 1.
Figure 1 shows the time series of aggregate D production obtained by
adding up the production of D ¯rms. Aggregate U production follows the
same dynamic pattern since U suppliers produce intermediate goods for D
production \on demand". As expected, in a complex adaptive system °uctu-
ations are irregular. Amplitude and periodicity vary wildly from sub-period
to sub-period.
Starting from identical initial conditions ¯rms become rapidly heteroge-
neous.7 Over time, a power law distribution of ¯rms' size emerges (see ¯gure
2), a result roughly in line with the evidence on the empirical ¯rms'size dis-
tribution (Axtell, 2001; Ga®eo et al.,2003). Once again this is not surprising
since the economy we are considering is characterized by heterogeneous in-
teracting agents.
In addition, the distribution of the number of links (connectivity) for each
lender (U ¯rm or bank) becomes asymmetric over time due to the preferred-
partner choice governing the interaction among borrowers and lenders. In
7In each period, each D ¯rm is hit by a price shock because the relative price is stochastic
as explained in section 2. Therefore the accumulation of net worth on the part of each
D ¯rm rapidly takes di®erent routes. The accumulation of net worth on the part of U
¯rms and banks is determined as a consequence. Neither U ¯rms nor banks, however, are
subject to individual shocks.
19other words the degree distribution of the credit network suggests that the
number of customers of lenders in the right tail of the distribution is higher
than that generated by a normal distribution (see ¯gure 3). The degree dis-
tribution, therefore, tends to a power law.
In the literature on evolving networks, a power law degree distribution is
generated when the choice of the partner is governed by preferential attach-
ment (Barabµ asi and Albert, 1999), which is based on the assumption that
nodes characterized by a relatively high number of links (\hubs") attract
more new links than nodes with a small number of connections. Preferential
attachment plays the role of a self-reinforcing mechanism: the higher the
number of links of a certain node today, the higher will be the number of
new links attached to that node tomorrow.
We do not make this ad hoc assumption but the same outcome occurs in
our model due to the preferred-partner choice rule. Agents characterized by
more robust ¯nancial conditions, in fact, can charge lower prices and attract
more new partners. As a consequence, their pro¯ts go up and their ¯nancial
conditions improve, making room for even lower prices in the future and
attracting more new partners. In a sense the preferred-partner choice rule
makes preferential attachment endogenous, through a mechanism similar to
that described in physics as ¯tness model (Bianconi and Barabµ asi, 2001).
Financially robust lenders can supply credit at better conditions and
therefore increase their market share, i.e. attract a higher number of links.
Financially sound U ¯rms (resp. banks) set lower prices (interest rates), at-
tract more D ¯rms (borrowers), are more pro¯table and further increase their
¯nancial robustness. The opposite holds true for ¯nancially fragile lenders.
Both the corporate and the banking sector therefore become polarized and
the degree distribution becomes asymmetric.
This polarization process increases the vulnerability of the network to a
shock { i.e. systemic risk { because the default of a highly connected agent,
albeit a relatively rare event, may generate an avalanche of bankruptcies.
The likelihood of this phenomenon depends on the structure of the network.
A typical story is the following. Suppose that Di belonging to ©j does not
ful¯ll its debt obligations towards Uj and goes bankrupt in t. Uj will record
a non-performing loan equal to the value of the intermediate goods not paid
for by Di so that its net worth will go down next period. If Uj were already
fragile and/or the loan extended to Di were big, Uj would go bankrupt in
t+1. If it survives the shock, the reduction in net worth will lead the bank to
20charge a higher interest rate r
j
zt+1 due to the U leverage and U ¯nancing gap
e®ect. Therefore also Uj can go bankrupt in one of the following periods.
The deterioration of the bank's ¯nancial condition due to the borrowers'
bankruptcies may be absorbed if the size of the loans is small enough and/or
the bank's net worth is high enough. If this is not the case, also the bank
goes bankrupt. An avalanche of bankruptcies will follow due to the positive
feedback of the bankruptcy of a single agent on the net worth of the \neigh-
bours", linked to the bankrupt agent by trade or credit links. For empirical
evidence on this phenomenon see Fujiwara (2007).
The extent of bankruptcy avalanches depends on the amount of bad debt
(see ¯gure 4). Bankruptcy avalanches amplify business °uctuations. As a
consequence, the distribution of aggregate growth rates is far from being
Gaussian. It can be likened to a double exponential distribution with an
asymmetry for negative events (see ¯gure 5).
In order to assess the robustness of our ¯ndings, we perform a series of
100 Monte Carlo (MC) simulations in the two following alternative scenarios:
² preferred-partner choice (PPC)
² random matching (RM).8
Figure 6 shows the degree distributions of the evolving (PPC) and the
random (RM) networks. When the PPC rule is at work the degree distribu-
tion is right-skew while this is not the case if the network evolves according
to a RM process. A similar result concerns the evolution of the ¯rm size
distribution: the PPC rule yields a right-skew (power law) distribution of
¯rms' size, while this is not the case when agents are linked at random (see
¯gure 7).
In table 3 we report some statistics on aggregate growth rates (GR), bad
debt (BD), the correlation between aggregate production (business cycle) and
debt-to-equity ratio (aggregate leverage ratio), bankruptcy probabilities, and
the correlation across sectors. Since distributions are generally non-normal,
we make use of robust statistics for the analysis of the location (median)
8The RM scenario is obtained from the ¯rst one setting " = 1: In the RM case the
interaction among agents is no longer due to the endogenous process described above;
instead, in each period, each agent interacts with another agent picked at random in the
population of potential partners.
21and scale (median absolute deviation) parameters.9 We also compute robust
measures of skewness (Groeneveld and Meeden, 1984)10 and kurtosis (Moors,
1988).11 For each variable in the table we report the average value and the
standard deviation (in parenthesis) across MC simulations.
The average growth rate (GR) of aggregate production is 0.13% both in
RM and in PPC. The median of GR and the volatility of aggregate output {
measured by the standard deviation or the median absolute deviation of GR
{ are slightly higher in PPC than in RM. In both scenarios the distribution
of GR is left-skew. The (negative) skewness, however, is higher in absolute
value in PPC. In other words, MC simulations show that there is a higher
incidence of negative events in PPC than in RM. Finally, in both scenarios
the kurtosis is not too far from that of a normal distribution. It is slightly
higher, however, in RM than in PPC.
It is worth noting that \traditional" and \robust" measures of aggregate
growth rates' statistical properties provide similar qualitative results. The
only relevant di®erence between RM and PPC is due to the higher incidence
of negative events in the distribution of aggregate growth rates in PPC,
resulting in a higher (negative) skewness of GR in PPC.
The median of the aggregate bad debt (BD) { that is the sum of the bad
debt of upstream ¯rms and banks { and the (robust) measures of skewness
and kurtosis are quite similar in the two settings.12 It is worth noting the
high level of skewness in both cases, signaling a right-skew distribution of BD,
with a relevant role of \extreme events", potentially leading to bankruptcy
propagation across the network due to the incidence of non-performing loans
on agents' balance sheets. Instead, the volatility of BD (e.g., the median
absolute deviation) is higher in PPC than in RM.
9The median absolute deviation is the median of the absolute values of the deviations
from the data's median.
10The robust measure of skewness (SK) is calculated as follows: SK = (¹¡Q2)=Ejyt ¡
Q2j, where yt represents the data, ¹ is the mean, and Q2 is the median. The SK statistic
has zero value for Gaussian data; the lower bound is -1 and the upper bound is +1.
11The robust measure of kurtosis (KR) is calculated as follows: KR = [(E7 ¡ E5) ¡
(E3 ¡ E1)]=(E6 ¡ E2) ¡ 1:23, where Ei is the i-octile of the distribution and 1:23 is the
value of KR for a normal distribution N(0,1). Accordingly, KR is equal to zero in the case
of Gaussian data.
12In this case we do not report \traditional" measures, because of the relevant discrep-
ancies, for example, between the mean and the median or the standard deviation and the
median absolute deviation. We report only robust statistics which are more accurate in
describing highly asymmetric non-normal distributions.
22Di®erently from an \island" economy, in the case of \direct interaction"
the default of one or more agents in a sector can propagate to other sectors,
increasing the likelihood of bankruptcy avalanches and negative events at
the aggregate level due to the deterioration of ¯nancial conditions. In order
to investigate this point, we compute the correlation between the number
of bankruptcies in di®erent sectors and the default probability for di®erent
typology of agents.
From table 3 we infer that there are positive correlations between bankrupt-
cies in di®erent sectors: the coe±cient of correlation between D and U de-
faults and between D and B defaults is a modest 0.2-0.3. Instead, the default
of U ¯rms considerably a®ects the B bankruptcies: in this case the coe±cient
of correlation is 0.7-0.8. Although the correlation coe±cients are slightly dif-
ferent, the linking process across sectors seems to produce similar results in
PPC and RM, independently of the speci¯c mechanism of interaction.
In general, the di®usion of bankruptcies originates in the defaults of one
or more D ¯rms that yield a deterioration of the ¯nancial conditions of U
¯rms, spread bankruptcies among U ¯rms and a propagation of the crisis to
the banking sector.
While the correlation structure across sectors is similar in PPC and RM,
bankruptcy probabilities vary signi¯cantly in the two settings. The total de-
fault probability (e.g., the probability that an agent fails in a given period)
is equal to 10% in RM and almost 11% in PPC. Also the bankruptcy prob-
ability of D ¯rms is quite similar in the two setting (16-17%). Instead, the
bankruptcy probability of U ¯rms is 1% in RM and more than 2% in PPC.
Furthermore, the bankruptcy probability of banks is 0.3% in RM and 3%
in PPC. Accordingly, the endogenous formation of the network produces a
con¯guration of productive and credit interlinkages that increases the proba-
bility of bankruptcy in the U sector (more than double with respect to RM)
and in the banking sector (ten times the RM level).
Even though the correlation among bankruptcies in di®erent sectors is
similar in the two scenarios, as said above, the greater incidence of defaults
in the U and banking sectors means that the endogenous network emerg-
ing from agents' choices increases the likelihood of bankruptcy propagation,
starting from idiosyncratic shocks regarding D ¯rms. In general, the evolving
network economy seems to show a higher systemic risk with respect to a ran-
dom network economy, as explained by the di®erent e®ects of interlinkages
con¯gurations on bankruptcy propagation across sectors.
23Finally, the correlation between an average indicator of the aggregate
leverage ratio, that is the debt-to-equity ratio, and the business cycle, that
is aggregate production, is very di®erent in the two scenarios: it is highly
positive in RM while it is not signi¯cant in PPC. In other words, in the PPC
scenario, di®erently from the RM case, the dynamics of the debt-to-equity
ratio seems decoupled from the dynamics of the business cycle. Hence, while
the random matching economy seems to be well described by an average
indicator of ¯nancial conditions, this is not the case for the evolving net-
work economy. We think that this fact is related to the di®erent topology of
the network governing agents' interactions. In the RM scenario the partner
is picked at random, in each period of time, and the random network has
a characteristic scale, that is the average degree distribution represents the
typical scale of the number of links per agent; then, in this case the behaviour
of the economy could be described by a \representative agent" with an av-
erage number of links and certain ¯nancial conditions. In the PPC scenario,
instead, the endogenous choice of partners leads to a scale-free degree dis-
tribution. In this case there is no characteristic scale of the network. The
high asymmetry of the degree distribution (e.g., many agents with a small
number of links and few agents - hubs - with a very large number of links)
does not allow to reduce aggregate dynamics to the average behaviour of a
representative agent. However, this aspect requires further investigation.
24Table 3. Monte Carlo simulations: RM vs. PPC.
RM PPC
mean(GR) 0:0013 (0:0000) 0:0013 (0:0000)
standard deviation(GR) 0:0393 (0:0018) 0:0401 (0:0025)
skewness(GR) ¡0:1238 (0:0838) ¡0:1393 (0:0696)
kurtosis(GR) 2:9386 (0:1510) 2:9132 (0:1657)
median(GR) 0:0022 (0:0010) 0:0025 (0:0010)
median absolute deviation(GR) 0:0266 (0:0014) 0:0273 (0:0020)
robust skewness(GR) ¡0:0279 (0:0315) ¡0:0356 (0:0301)
robust kurtosis(GR) 0:0031 (0:0521) ¡0:0018 (0:0567)
median(BD) 37:2940 (1:5381) 36:8541 (3:8340)
median absolute deviation(BD) 12:0540 (1:2254) 16:49 (2:7380)
robust skewness(BD) 0:6612 (0:0681) 0:6518 (0:0880)
robust kurtosis(BD) 0:4279 (0:1523) 0:4031 (0:1918)
bankruptcy rate: corr(D,U) 0:2683 (0:0327) 0:2895 (0:0261)
bankruptcy rate: corr(D,B) 0:2044 (0:0324) 0:2196 (0:0295)
bankruptcy rate: corr(U,B) 0:7970 (0:0240) 0:7472 (0:0194)
bankruptcy rate: corr(D+U,B) 0:4320 (0:0327) 0:4200 (0:0284)
bankruptcy probability 0:1009 (0:0000) 0:1093 (0:0011)
bankruptcy probability: D 0:1656 (0:0000) 0:1670 (0:0000)
bankruptcy probability: U 0:0104 (0:0000) 0:0253 (0:0014)
bankruptcy probability: B 0:0035 (0:0000) 0:0310 (0:0022)
corr(Debt-to-Equity,Y) 0:6024 (0:1540) ¡0:0453 (0:2187)
9 Concluding remarks
We have explored the properties of a credit network characterized by in-
side credit (i.e. credit relationships connecting agents belonging to di®erent
groups of the same sector, i.e. D ¯rms and U ¯rms) and outside credit (i.e.
credit relationships connecting agents belonging to di®erent sectors, i.e. ¯rms
and banks).
The network structure changes over time due to the preferred-partner
choice rule, which implies that endogenous changes of the interest rate on
trade credit and on bank loans a®ect the number of clients of each U ¯rm and
each bank. This rule has the same implication for the evolution of network
topology as the preferential attachment rule but is not based upon an ad
25hoc assumption. On the contrary, the preferred-partner choice rule captures
an important aspect of the agents' decision making, i.e. the choice of the
partner o®ering the best bargain in terms of price. The changing topology of
the network a®ects the propagation of bankruptcies and the shape of business
°uctuations.
The borrower's net worth is a proxy of creditworthiness. Hence credit
extended is increasing with the borrowers' net worth. Since D output {
which consists of consumption goods { is constrained only by the availability
of funds, in the end, the supply of consumption goods is increasing with D
net worth. The net worth of D ¯rms turns out to be the driver of growth and
°uctuations. U production, in fact, is determined by demand of intermediate
inputs on the part of D ¯rms. Changes in the D net worth, therefore, yield
changes in the same direction of U production. Also banks are involved
because the interest rate that a bank charges is a function of borrowers' net
worth.
If a D ¯rm goes bankrupt, not only the supply chain can be disrupted
{ involving U ¯rms { but also an interest rate hike can follow due to the
change in attitude of lenders. More bankruptcies will follow in a bankruptcy
avalanche.
The output of simulations shows that a business cycle at the macroeco-
nomic level can develop as a consequence of the complex interaction of the
¯nancial conditions of the agents involved. We can also reproduce the main
facts of ¯rms' demography: power law distribution of ¯rms' size and Laplace
distribution of growth rates. The preferred choice rule a®ects essentially the
skewness of the ¯rms' size distribution and of the degree distribution of the
network.
This is a step in a complex and di±cult quest for a \complete" credit
network. There are obvious restrictions on the conditions determining the
model environment which we plan to relax in the future. For instance, we
would like to extend the preferred choice rule also to the market for consump-
tion goods and to the labour market. This will imply a more sophisticated
design of households' behaviour, which so far has been essentially passive.
Another obvious extension is the introduction of an interbank market, which
will allow modelling the central bank and monetary policy.
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Figure 7: Firm size distribution: RM vs. PCC
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